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1 OCT 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with Secretary Brown, 30 September 1977

25X1 1. [] FY 79 NFIP Budget. The Secretary requested that I
25X1 hear []/Mr. Dinneen present the OSD view of the NFIP
budget prior to making decisions on it. I assured them that was
my intent, and I would certainly do that.

25X1 2. [] Imagery Mix Matrices. I raised the question of Secretary
Duncan's 22 September memorandum to me on these matrices. He raised
three points. I addressed them as follows:

a. He said the existing proven systems were compared with
engineering speculations. I pointed out that in the new version
there is color coding to take care of this point, and this seemed
to satisfy him.

b. The matrices appeared to him to assume simultaneous
accomplishment of both search and point target missions. I told
him that is exactly the way I understood the matrices, i.e.,
when it showed "limited area and moderate search," it meant that
in a reasonable period of time it could do both of those. I told
him that if we were overestimating these capabilities in any
instances, I would appreciate hearing about it.

[I would appreciate having [] check my under-
standing of that.]

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25X1 c. He suggested the matrices were preempting the study that
is under way by []. I told him I was looking forward
to the product of that study, though I understood it was to do with
the engineering aspects, not the preferred mix issue. He confirmed
that was the case.

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25X1 4. [] NITC. We looked at the various ramifications of the NITC, in particular where it would be located.

a. We particularly discussed the secure television going in between the Pentagon and the White House Situation Room. I pointed out that I thought this needed to be expanded so that speakers in both rooms could see each other, and so that there could be a national intelligence input to the Situation Room as well as a Pentagon operations input. Secretary Brown agreed on both points.

b. We then talked about the possibility of moving NITC into the Pentagon. We discussed the problem of the amount of space that would be needed, particularly if we kept the entire NITC organization intact, and not just the Watch Center. Secretary Brown directed Admiral Holcomb to have someone start looking at the amount of space that might be available. I proposed the possibility that the CCF might become a subordinate section of the NITC, but integral to it so as to save space and prevent duplication.

c. This led to a discussion of the differences of opinion over the wording of the new Executive Order on NSA tasking. Secretary Brown's concern in wanting to have some authority to task NSA was for operational safety in emergencies.

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25X1 [] I pointed out that I had wanted to have a paragraph in the Executive Order which stipulated that when operational necessity required it, a national intelligence collection system, with a military man in it, could be diverted from an assigned tasking by the military commander with notification to the NITC. This provision has since fallen out.

There was a line of uncertainty as to whether in such an emergency it might be necessary also to retask a national intelligence collection system []

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
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I pointed out that the Presidential decision gave the DCI full tasking authority over all national systems. Secretary Brown closed by saying that we needed to work out some wording on this.

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[I would like to go back and find my original wording on the authority of a military commander to divert or abort a mission of any manned military platform that had been tasked by the National Intelligence Tasking Center without reference to the National Intelligence Tasking Center, but with prompt notification to it. 

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collection

Secretary Brown raised the issue of/management in crises. He said the JCS were very upset about this proposed paragraph. He, however, felt that it was adequately covered elsewhere and therefore wasn't a real issue though that doesn't necessarily mean he won't continue to treat it as one.

STANSFIELD TURNER

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